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Why Did Lagrange “Prove” the
Parallel Postulate?
Judith V. Grabiner
1. INTRODUCTION. We begin with an often-told story from the Budget of Para-
doxes by Augustus de Morgan: “Lagrange, in one of the later years of his life, imag-
ined” that he had solved the problem of proving Euclid’s parallel postulate. “He went
so far as to write a paper, which he took with him to the [Institut de France], and began
to read it.”
But, De Morgan continues, “something struck him which he had not observed: he
muttered ‘Il faut que j’y songe encore’ [I’ve got to think about this some more] and
put the paper in his pocket” [8, p. 288].
Is De Morgan’s story true? Not quite in that form. But, as Bernard Cohen used to
say, “Truth is more interesting than fiction.” First, according to the published minutes
of the Institut for 3 February 1806, “M. Delagrange read an analysis of the theory of
parallels” [25, p. 314; italics added]. Those present are listed in the minutes: Lacroix,
Cuvier, Bossut, Delambre, Legendre, Jussieu, Lamarck, Charles, Monge, Laplace,
Hau¨y, Berthollet, Fourcroy—a most distinguished audience!
Furthermore: Lagrange did not throw his manuscript away. It survives in the library
of the Institut de France [32]. There is a title page that says, in what looks to me like
Lagrange’s handwriting, “On the theory of parallels: memoir read in 1806,” together
with the signatures of yet more distinguished people: Prony and Poisson, along with
Legendre and Lacroix. The first page of text says, again in Lagrange’s handwriting,
that it was “read at the Institut in the meeting of 3 February 1806.”
It is true that Lagrange never did publish it, so he must have realized there was
something wrong. In another version of the story, told by Jean-Baptiste Biot, who
claims to have been there (though the minutes do not list his name), everybody there
could see that something was wrong, so Lagrange’s talk was followed by a moment
of complete silence [2, p. 84]. Still, Lagrange kept the manuscript with his papers for
posterity to read.
This episode raises the three questions I will address in this article. First, what did
Lagrange actually say in this paper? Second, once we have seen how he “proved”
the parallel postulate, why did he do it the way he did? And last, above all, why did
Joseph-Louis Lagrange, the consummate analyst, creator of the Analytical Mechan-
ics, of Lagrange’s theorem in group theory and the Lagrange remainder of the Taylor
series, pioneer of the calculus of variations, champion of pure analysis and foe of ge-
ometric intuition, why did Lagrange risk trying to prove Euclid’s parallel postulate
from the others, a problem that people had been unsuccessfully trying to solve for
2000 years? Why was this particular problem in geometry so important to him?
I think that the manuscript is interesting in its own right, but I intend also to use it to
show how Lagrange and his contemporaries thought about mathematics, physics, and
the universe. As we will see, this was not the way we view these topics today.
2. THE CONTENTS OF LAGRANGE’S 1806 PAPER. First, we look at the con-
tents of the paper Lagrange read in 1806. The manuscript begins by asserting that
the theory of parallels is fundamental to all of geometry. Notably, that includes the
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facts that the sum of the angles of a triangle is two right angles, and that the sides
of similar triangles are proportional. But Lagrange agreed with both the ancients and
moderns who thought that the parallel postulate should not be assumed, but needed to
be proved.
To see why people wanted to prove the parallel postulate, let us recall Euclid’s five
geometric postulates [9, pp. 154–155]. The first is that a straight line can be drawn from
any point to any other point; the second, that a finite straight line can be produced to
any length; the third, that a circle can be drawn with any point as center and any given
radius; the fourth, that all right angles are equal; and the fifth, the so-called parallel
postulate, which is the one in question. Euclid’s parallel postulate is not, as a number
of writers wrongly say (e.g., [5, p. 126]), the statement that only one line can be drawn
parallel to a given line through an outside point. Euclid’s postulate states that, if a
straight line falls on two straight lines making the sum of the interior angles on the
same side of that line less than two right angles, then the two straight lines eventually
meet on that side. Euclid used Postulate 5 explicitly only once: to prove that if two lines
are parallel, the alternate interior angles are equal. Of course, many later propositions
rest on this theorem, and thus presuppose the parallel postulate.
Already in antiquity, people were trying to prove Postulate 5 from the others. Why?
Of course one wants to assume as little as possible in a demonstrative science, but few
questions were raised about Postulates 1–4. The historical focus on the fifth postulate
came because it felt more like the kind of thing that gets proved. It is not self-evident,
it requires a diagram even to explain, so it might have seemed more as though it should
be a theorem. In any case, there is a tradition of attempted proofs throughout the Greek
and then Islamic and then eighteenth-century mathematical worlds. Lagrange followed
many eighteenth-century mathematicians in seeing the lack of a proof of the fifth pos-
tulate as a serious defect in Euclid’s Elements. But Lagrange’s criticism of the pos-
tulate in his manuscript is unusual. He said that the assumptions of geometry should
be demonstrable “just by the principle of contradiction”—the same way, he said, that
we know the axiom that the whole is greater than the part [32, p. 30R]. The theory of
parallels rests on something that is not self-evident, he believed, and he wanted to do
something about this.
Now it had long been known—at least since Proclus in the fifth century—that the
“only one parallel” property is an easy consequence of Postulate 5. In the eighteenth
century, “only one parallel” was adopted as a postulate by John Playfair in his 1795
textbook Elements of Geometry and by A.-M. Legendre in his highly influential Ele-
ments of Geometry [34]. So this equivalent to Postulate 5 had long been around; in the
1790s people focused on it, and so did Lagrange. But Lagrange, unlike Playfair and
Legendre, didn’t assume the uniqueness of parallels; he “proved” it. Perhaps now the
reader may be eager to know, how did Lagrange prove it?
Recall that Lagrange said in this manuscript that axioms should follow from the
principle of contradiction. But, he added, besides the principle of contradiction, “There
is another principle equally self-evident,” and that is Leibniz’s principle of sufficient
reason. That is: nothing is true “unless there is a sufficient reason why it should be so
and not otherwise” [42, p. 31; italics added]. This, said Lagrange, gives as solid a basis
for mathematical proof as does the principle of contradiction [32, p. 30V].
But is it legitimate to use the principle of sufficient reason in mathematics? La-
grange said that we are justified in doing this, because it has already been done. For
example, Archimedes used it to establish that equal weights at equal distances from the
fulcrum of a lever balance. Lagrange added that we also use it to show that three equal
forces acting on the same point along lines separated by a third of the circumference
of a circle are in equilibrium [32, pp. 31R–31V].
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Now we are ready to see how Lagrange deduced the uniqueness of parallels from
the principle of sufficient reason.
Suppose DE is drawn parallel to the given line AB through the given point C. Now
suppose the parallel DE isn’t unique. Then we can also draw FG parallel to AB. (See
Figure 1a.) But everything ought to be equal on each side, Lagrange said, so there is no
reason that FG should make, with DE, the angle ECG on the right side; why not also
on the left side? So the line HCI, making the angle DCH equal to angle ECG, ought
also to be parallel to AB. One can see why the argument so far seemed consistent with









Figure 1a. Lagrange’s proof, step 1.
By the same procedure, he continued, we can now make another line KL that makes
angle HCK equal to angle ICG, but placed on the other side of the new parallel line
HI (see Figure 1b); and we can keep on in this way to make arbitrarily many in this











Figure 1b. Lagrange’s proof, step 2.
The modern reader may object that Lagrange’s symmetry arguments are, like the
uniqueness of parallels, equivalent to Euclid’s postulate. But the logical correctness,
or lack thereof, of Lagrange’s proof is not the point. (In this manuscript, by the way,
Lagrange went on to give an analogous proof—also by the principle of sufficient
reason—that between two points there is just one straight line, because if there were a















Figure 1c. Lagrange’s proof, last step.
second straight line on one side of the first, we could then draw a third straight line on
the other side, and so on [32, pp. 34R–34V]. Lagrange, then, clearly liked this sort of
argument.)
3. WHY DID HE ATTACK THE PROBLEM THIS WAY? It is now time to ad-
dress the second, and more important question: Why did he do it in the way he did?
I want to argue this: Lagrange’s arguments from sufficient reason were shaped by
properties of space, space as it was believed to be in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. These properties are profoundly Euclidean. To eighteenth-century thinkers,
space was infinite, it was exactly the same in all directions, no direction was privileged,
it was like the plane in having no curvature, and symmetrical situations were equiv-
alent. Lagrange himself explicitly linked his symmetry arguments to Leibniz’s prin-
ciple of sufficient reason, but—as we will see—these ideas are also historically linked
to Giordano Bruno’s arguments for the infinite universe, Descartes’ view of space as
indefinite material extension, the projective geometry used to describe perspective in
Renaissance art, various optimization arguments like “light travels in straight lines
because that is the shortest path,” and, above all, the Newtonian doctrine of absolute
space. As we will soon see, these properties were essential to physical science in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: both physics and philosophy promoted the iden-
tification of space with its Euclidean structure.
This goes along with a shift in emphasis concerning what Euclidean geometry
is about. Geometry, in ancient times, was the study of geometric figures: triangles,
circles, parallelograms, and the like, but by the eighteenth century it had become the
study of space [41, chapter 5]. The space eighteenth-century geometry was about was,
in Henri Poincare´’s words, “continuous, infinite, three-dimensional, homogeneous and
isotropic” [44, p. 25]. Bodies moved through it preserving their sizes and shapes. The
possible curvature of three-dimensional space did not even occur to eighteenth-century
geometers. Their space was Euclidean through and through.
Why did philosophers conclude that space had to be infinite, homogeneous, and the
same in all directions? Effectively, because of the principle of sufficient reason. For
instance, Giordano Bruno in 1600 argued that the universe must be infinite because
there is no reason to stop at any point; the existence of an infinity of worlds is no
less reasonable than the existence of a finite number of them. Descartes used simi-
lar reasoning in his Principles of Philosophy: “We recognize that this world. . . has no
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limits in its extension. . . . Wherever we imagine such limits, we . . . imagine beyond
them some indefinitely extended space” [28, p. 104]. Similar arguments were used by
other seventeenth-century authors, including Newton. Descartes identified space and
the extension of matter, so geometry was, for him, about real physical space. But geo-
metric space, for Descartes, had to be Euclidean. This is because the theory of parallel
lines is crucial for Descartes’ analytic geometry—not for Cartesian coordinates, which
Descartes did not have, but because he needed the theory of similar figures in order
to give meaning to expressions of arbitrary powers of x [23, p. 197]. Descartes was
the first person to justify using such powers. But an expression like x4 for Descartes
is not the volume of a 4-dimensional figure, but a line, which can be defined as the
fourth proportional to the unit line, x , and x3. That is, 1/x = x3/x4. They are all
lines, and since all powers of x are lines, they can all be constructed geometrically—
but only if we have the theory of similar triangles, for which we need the theory of
parallels.
Now let us turn from seventeenth-century philosophy to seventeenth-century
physics. Descartes, some 50 years before Newton published his first law of mo-
tion, was a co-discoverer of what we call linear inertia: that in the absence of external
influences a moving body goes in a straight line at a constant speed. Descartes called
this the first law of nature, and for him, this law follows from what we now recognize
as the principle of sufficient reason. Descartes said, “Nor is there any reason to think
that, if [a part of matter] moves. . . and is not impeded by anything, it should ever by
itself cease to move with the same force” [30, p. 75]. And the straight-line motion of
physical moving bodies obviously requires the indefinite extendability of straight lines
and thus indefinitely large, if not infinite, space [23, p. 97].
Descartes’ contemporary Pierre Gassendi, another co-discoverer of linear inertia,
used “sufficient reason” to argue for both inertia and the isotropy of space. Gassendi
said, “In principle, all directions are of equal worth,” so that in empty spaces, “motion,
in whatever direction it occurs. . . will neither accelerate nor retard; and hence will
never cease” [29, p. 127].
Artists, too, helped people learn to see space as Euclidean. We see the space created
in the paintings and buildings of the Renaissance and later as Euclidean. Renaissance
artists liked to portray floors with rectangular tiles and similar symmetric architectural
objects—to show how good they were at perspective. These works of art highlight the
observations that parallel lines are everywhere equidistant, that two lines perpendicular
to a third line are parallel to each other. And our experience of perspective in art and
architecture helps us shape the space we believe we live in. (See Figures 2, 3, and 4.)
We have seen pictures like these many times, but consider them now as conditioning
people to think in a particular way about the space we live in: as Euclidean, symmetric,
and indefinitely extendible—going on to infinity [11].
Figure 2. Piero della Francesca (1410/1420–1492), “The Ideal City.”
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Figure 3. Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519), “The Last Supper.”
Figure 4. Raphael (1483–1520), “The School of Athens.”
Artist-mathematicians like Piero della Francesca began the development of the sub-
ject of projective geometry, but the first definitive mathematical treatise on it is that
of Girard Desargues in the 1630s. Seventeenth-century projective geometry used the
cone (like the artist’s rays of sight or light) to prove properties of all the conic sections
as projections of the circle. For instance, geometers treated the ellipse as the circle
projected to a plane not perpendicular to the cone. And the parabola, as Kepler pointed
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out, behaves projectively like an ellipse with one focus at infinity. So projective geom-
etry explicitly brought infinity into Euclidean geometry: planes and lines go to infinity;
parallel lines meet at the point at infinity.
And the geometry of perspective and projective geometry reinforced Euclideanness
in a wide variety of other ways, from the role of Euclid’s Optics in the humanistic
classical tradition to the use of the theory of parallels to draw military fortifications
from 2-dimensional battlefield sketches [12, p. 24].
Although these Euclidean views prevailed, perhaps they didn’t have to. There were
alternatives suggested even in the eighteenth century [22]. Is visual space Euclidean?
Not necessarily. Bishop Berkeley, for instance, said that we don’t “see” distance at
all; we merely infer it from the angles we do see. And Thomas Reid pointed out that
a straight line right in front of you looks exactly like a circle curved with you at the
center—or even a circle curved away from you in the other direction. Reid gave a set
of rules for visual space—he called this the “geometry of visibles”—which clearly are
not Euclid’s rules; a modern philosopher has called Reid’s geometry of visibles “the
geometry of the single point of view” [46, p. 396].
And there are other alternatives to Euclideanness. Cultures other than the western
often speak about space differently and order their perceptions differently: particular
directions have special connotations, and “closeness” can be cultural as well as metri-
cal. Many cultures do not use the idea of an outside abstract space at all; instead—as
Leibniz did—they recognize only the relations between bodies [3], [35], [36]. So, as
a matter of empirical fact, abstract Euclidean space is not something that all human
thinkers do use, let alone that all humans must use.
In the twentieth century, experimental psychologists showed that when people in a
dark room are asked to put luminous points into two equidistant lines, or two parallel
lines, the people are satisfied when the lines in fact curve away from the observer. As
a result, Rudolf Luneburg in the 1940s claimed that visual space is a hyperbolic space
of constant curvature; later psychological experiments suggest that visual space is not
represented by any consistent geometry [48, pp. 30–31].
Even in the Renaissance, some painters portrayed what we now recognize as
3-dimensional non-Euclidean spaces, using reflections in a convex mirror, notably
Parmigianino’s (1524) “Self Portrait in a Convex Mirror,” and, most famously, the
“Arnolfini Wedding” by Jan van Eyck (1434). (See Figures 5, 6a, and 6b.) In the
spaces in these mirrors, parallel lines are not everywhere equidistant.
Figure 5. Parmigianino (1503–1540), “Self Portrait in a Convex Mirror.”
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Figure 6a. Jan van Eyck (c. 1390–1441), “The Arnolfini Wedding.”
Figure 6b. Detail from “The Arnolfini Wedding.”
A modern physicist, John Barrow, has said that if people had paid more attention
to these mirrors, non-Euclidean geometry might have been discovered much sooner
[1, p. 176]. But I am not so sure. I think that these artists viewed convex mirrors
as presenting an especially difficult problem in portraying 3-dimensional Euclidean
space on a 2-dimensional Euclidean canvas; for instance, J. M. W. Turner included
such drawings in his strongly Euclidean lectures [45] on perspective. (See Figures 7a,
7b.)
The winning view, I think, is that expressed by the Oxford art historian Martin
Kemp, who says that from the Renaissance to the nineteenth century, the goal of con-
structing “a model of the world as it appears to a rational, objective observer” [27,
p. 314] was shared by scientists and artists alike. Virtually unanimously, artists, armed
with Euclid’s Optics, have long helped teach us to “see” a Euclidean world.
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Figure 7a. J. M. W. Turner (1775–1851), “Spheres at Different Distances from the Eye.” c© Tate, London
2008.
Figure 7b. J. M. W. Turner, “Reflections in a Single Metal Globe and in a Pair of Polished Metal Globes.”
c© Tate, London 2008.
4. THE CRUCIAL ARGUMENT: NEWTONIAN PHYSICS. Let us now return
to physics and to the most important seventeenth-century argument of all for the real-
ity of infinite Euclidean space: Newtonian mechanics. Newton needed absolute space
as a reference frame, so he could argue that there is a difference between real and ap-
parent accelerations. He wanted this so he could establish that the forces involved with
absolute (as opposed to relative) accelerations are real, and thus that gravity is real.
Newton’s absolute space is infinite and uniform, “always similar and immovable” [38,
p. 6], and he described its properties in Euclidean terms. And it is real; it has a Platonic
kind of reality.
Leibniz, by contrast, did not believe in absolute space. He not only said that spatial
relations were just the relations between bodies, he used the principle of sufficient
reason to show this. If there were absolute space, there would have to be a reason
to explain why two objects would be related in one way if East is in one direction
and West in the opposite direction, and related in another way if East and West were
reversed [24, p. 147]. Surely, said Leibniz, the relation between two objects is just
one thing! But Leibniz did use arguments about symmetry and sufficient reason—
sufficient reason was his principle, after all. Thus, although Descartes and Leibniz did
not believe in empty absolute space and Newton did, they all agreed that what I am
calling the Euclidean properties of space are essential to physics.
In the eighteenth century, the Leibniz-Newton debate on space was adjudicated by
one of Lagrange’s major intellectual influences, Leonhard Euler. In his 1748 essay
“Reflections on Space and Time,” Euler argued that space must be real; it cannot be
January 2009] WHY DID LAGRANGE “PROVE” THE PARALLEL POSTULATE? 11
just the relations between bodies as the Leibnizians claim [10]. This is because of
the principles of mechanics—that is, Newton’s first and second laws. These laws are
beyond doubt, because of the “marvelous” agreement they have with the observed mo-
tions of bodies. The inertia of a single body, Euler said, cannot possibly depend on the
behavior of other bodies. The conservation of uniform motion in the same direction
makes sense, he said, only if measured with respect to immovable space, not to var-
ious other bodies. And space is not in our minds, said Euler; how can physics—real
physics—depend on something in our minds? So space for Euler is real.
The philosopher Immanuel Kant was influenced by Euler’s analysis [14, pp. 29,
207]. Kant agreed that we need space to do Newtonian physics. But in his Critique
of Pure Reason of 1781, Kant placed space in the mind nonetheless. We order our
perceptions in space, but space itself is in the mind, an intuition of the intellect. Nev-
ertheless, Kant’s space turned out to be Euclidean too. Kant argued that we need the
intuition of space to prove theorems in geometry. This is because it is in space that we
make the constructions necessary to prove theorems. And what theorem did Kant use
as an example? The sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles, a result
whose proof requires the truth of the parallel postulate [26, “Of space,” p. 423].
Even outside of mathematics and physics, explicit appeals to sufficient reason,
symmetry, parallels, and infinity pervade eighteenth-century thought, from balancing
chemical equations to symmetry in architecture to the balance of powers in the U.S.
Constitution.
Let me call one last witness from philosophy: Voltaire. Like many thinkers in the
eighteenth century, Voltaire said that universal agreement was a marker for truth. Reli-
gious sects disagree about many things, he said, so on these topics they are all wrong.
But by contrast, they all agree that one should worship God and be just; therefore
that must be true. Voltaire pointed out also that “There are no sects in geometry” [47,
p. 195]. One does not say, “I’m a Euclidean, I’m an Archimedean.” What everyone
agrees on: that is what is true. “There is but one morality,“ said Voltaire, “as there is
but one geometry” [47, p. 225].
5. THE ARGUMENT FROM EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY MATHEMATICS
AND SCIENCE. Now let us turn to eighteenth-century mathematics and science.
Eighteenth-century geometers tended to go beyond Euclid himself in assuming Eu-
clideanness. As a first example, look at the 1745 Ele´mens de Ge´ome´trie by Alexis-
Claude Clairaut. Clairaut grounded geometry not on Euclid’s postulates but on the
capacity of the mind to understand clear and distinct ideas. For instance, Euclid had
defined parallel lines as lines in the same plane that never meet. Clairaut, less inter-
ested in proof than in Euclidean plausibility, defined parallel lines as lines that are
everywhere equally distant from one another [6, p. 10]. The great French Encyclope-
dia [7, vol. 11, pp. 905–906] defined parallel lines as “lines that prolonged to infinity
never get closer or further from one another, or that meet at an infinite distance” [ital-
ics added] assuming, then, a uniform, flat Euclidean space infinitely extended. The
“equidistant” definition of parallels is reinforced by ordinary language, as we speak of
parallel developments, or, more geometrically, ships on parallel courses, and even of
parallels of latitude.
And speaking of latitude raises the question of why the fact that the geometry on the
surface of a sphere, with great circles serving as “lines,” is not Euclidean—there are no
parallels, for example—did not shake mathematicians’ conviction that all of Euclid’s
postulates are true and mutually consistent. Lagrange himself is supposed to have said
that spherical trigonometry does not need Euclid’s parallel postulate [4, pp. 52–53].
But the surface of a sphere, in the eighteenth-century view, is not non-Euclidean; it
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exists in 3-dimensional Euclidean space [20, p. 71]. The example of the sphere helps
us see that the eighteenth-century discussion of the parallel postulate’s relationship to
the other postulates is not really about what is logically possible, but about what is true
of real space.
Now, let us turn to eighteenth-century physics. As we will see, Euclideanness, es-
pecially the theory of parallels and the principle of sufficient reason, was essential to
the science of mechanics in the eighteenth century, not only to its exposition, but to its
progress.
Johann Heinrich Lambert was one of the mathematicians who worked on the prob-
lem of Postulate 5. Lambert explicitly recognized that he had not been able to prove
it, and considered that it might always have to remain a postulate. He even briefly sug-
gested a possible geometry on a sphere with an imaginary radius. But Lambert also
observed that the parallel postulate is related to the law of the lever [20, p. 75]. He said
that a lever with weightless arms and with equal weights at equal distances is balanced
by a force in the opposite direction at the center equal to the sum of the weights, and
that all these forces are parallel. So either we are using the parallel postulate, or per-
haps, Lambert thought, some day we could use this physical result to prove the parallel
postulate.
Lagrange himself in his Analytical Mechanics [31, pp. 4–5] gave an argument about
balancing an isosceles triangle similar to, but much more complex than, Lambert’s
discussion. Lagrange himself did not explicitly link the law of the lever to the parallel
postulate, but the geometry of the equilibrium situation that Lagrange was describing
nonetheless requires it [4, pp. 182–183]. In a similar move, d’Alembert had tried to
deduce the general law of conservation of momentum purely from symmetry principles
[13, pp. 821–823]. And in the 1820s, J.-B. Fourier, from a very different philosophical
point of view, also said that the parallel postulate could be derived from the law of the
lever. From this Fourier concluded that geometry follows from statics and so geometry
is a physical science [20, pp. 78–79]. But note that it is still Euclidean geometry.
Let us now concentrate further on Lagrange’s mechanics. His deepest conviction
was that a subject must be seen in its full generality. Like many Enlightenment thinkers
only more so, Lagrange wanted to reduce the vast number of laws and principles to a
single fundamental general principle, preferably one that is independent of experience.
“Sufficient reason” was such a principle.
Although he did not explicitly cite Leibniz’s principle in his Analytical Mechanics
[43, p. 146], Lagrange used it frequently. For instance, he wrote, “The equilibrium of a
straight and horizontal lever with equal weights and with the fulcrum at its midpoint is
a self-evident truth because there is no reason that either of the weights should move.”
Another key example of Euclideanness as physical argument is the use of paral-
lelograms to find resultant forces. Lagrange, in his Analytical Mechanics, used the
principle of sufficient reason, Euclid’s theory of parallels, and the infinity of space and
its Euclidean nature to discuss the composition of forces [31, p. 17]. He said that a
body which is moved uniformly in two different directions simultaneously must nec-
essarily traverse the diagonal of the parallelogram whose sides it would have followed
separately. So parallels are needed. Lagrange continued, “with regard to the direction
in the case of two equal forces, it is obvious that there is no reason that the resul-
tant force should be nearer to one than the other of these two equal forces; therefore
it must bisect the angle formed by these two forces” [31, p. 21]. Lagrange also used
the principle of composition of forces to get the conditions of equilibrium when two
parallel forces are applied to the extremities of a straight lever. He suggested that we
imagine “that the directions of the forces extend to infinity” and then, on this basis, we
can prove that “the resultant force must pass through the point of support.” In effect
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this is the parallelogram argument with the corner of the parallelogram at infinity.
Lagrange tried to reduce even his own fundamental physical principle—the principle
of virtual velocities—to levers and parallelograms of forces, and after him Ampe`re,
Carnot, Laplace, and Poisson tried to do the same [39, p. 218].
Pierre-Simon Laplace, too, related a priori arguments, including sufficient reason
and Euclid’s theory of parallels, to argue that physical laws had to be the way they
were. For instance he said that a particle on a sphere moves in a great circle because
“there is no reason why it should deviate to the right rather than the left of that great
circle”—notice, “not a word about the forces acting on this particle on this sphere” [15,
p. 104]. Laplace also asked why gravitation had to be inverse-square, and gave a geo-
metric answer [4, p. 53], [16, p. 310]. He said that inverse-square gravitation implies
that if the size of all bodies and all distances in the whole universe were to decrease
proportionally, the bodies would describe the same curves that they do now, so that
universe would still look exactly the same. The observer, then, needs to recognize only
the ratios. So, Laplace said, even though we haven’t proved Euclid’s fifth postulate,
we know it must be true, and so the theorems deduced from it must also be true. For
Laplace, then, the idea of space includes the following self-evident property: similar
figures have proportional sides [4, p. 54]. The Newtonian physical universe requires
similar figures to have proportional sides, and this of course requires the theory of
parallels, and thus geometry must be Euclidean [33, p. 472].
These men did not want to do mechanics, as, say, Newton had done. They wanted
to show not only that the world was this way, but that it necessarily had to be. A mod-
ern philosophical critic, Helmut Pulte, has said that Lagrange’s attempt to “reduce”
mechanics to analysis strikes us today as “a misplaced endeavour to mathematize. . . an
empirical science, and thus to endow it with infallibility” [39, p. 220]. Lagrange would
have responded, “Right! That’s just exactly what we are all doing.” Lagrange thought
these two things: Geometry is necessarily true; mechanics is mathematics. He needed
them both.
6. WHY DID IT MATTER SO MUCH? And now, we are ready for the last ques-
tion. Why did actually proving Postulate 5 matter so much to Lagrange and to his
contemporaries? I trust I have convinced the reader of the central role of Euclidean-
ness in the eighteenth century. But still, if it were just a matter of simple logic, surely
after 2000 years people should have concluded: we have been trying as hard as pos-
sible, we cannot imagine how to prove this, so let us just concede defeat. It can’t
be done. Euclid was right in deciding that it had to be assumed as a postulate. Why
did eighteenth-century geometers not settle for this, and, in particular, why didn’t La-
grange?
Because there was so much at stake. Because space, for Newtonian physics, has
to be uniform, infinite, and Euclidean, and because metaphysical principles like that
of sufficient reason and optimality were seen both as Euclidean and as essential to
eighteenth-century thought. How could all of this rest on a mere assumption? So, many
eighteenth-century thinkers believed that it was crucial to shore up the foundations of
Euclid’s geometry, and we can place Lagrange’s manuscript in the historical context
of the many attempts in the eighteenth century to cure this “blemish” in Euclid by
proving Postulate 5.
Also, Lagrange was not just any eighteenth-century mathematician. Lagrange was,
mathematically speaking, a Cartesian and a Leibnizian. His overall philosophy of
mathematics was to reduce each subject to the most general possible principle. In cal-
culus, as I have argued at length in two books [17], [18], Lagrange wanted to reduce
all the ideas of limits and infinites and infinitesimals and rates of change or fluxions to
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“the algebraic analysis of finite quantities.” In algebra, Lagrange said that even New-
ton’s idea of algebra as “universal arithmetic” wasn’t general enough; algebra was the
study of systems of operations. In mechanics, his goal was to reduce everything to the
principle of virtual velocities—and then to use “only algebraic operations subject to
a regular and uniform procedure” [31, preface]. Lagrange even composed his Analyt-
ical Mechanics without a single diagram, precisely so he could show he had reduced
physics to pure analysis. Geometry, then, ought also to be reducible to self-evident
principles, to clear, distinct, and general ideas.
Finally, there are social causes to be considered. First, the social background will
help answer this question: Why was Lagrange doing this in 1806, as opposed, say, to
the 1760s when he taught mathematics at the military school in Turin or in the 1770s
and 1780s when he was the leading light of the Berlin Academy of Sciences? One
reason is that in about 1800 there was a revival of interest in synthetic geometry in
France. There was a Parisian school in synthetic geometry including Monge, Servois,
Biot, Lacroix, Argand, Lazare Carnot and his students, and Legendre. Important rea-
sons for this were partly practical, partly ideological [40, p. 450]. The practical needs
are related to Monge’s championing of descriptive geometry, so clearly useful in ar-
chitecture and in military planning. Monge also helped directly to pique Lagrange’s
interest, writing two letters to him in the early 1790s soliciting his assistance on prob-
lems involving the geometry of perspective [37].
As for the ideology promoting geometry in France after the Revolution, as Joan
Richards has written, “the quintessentially reasonable study of universally known
space had a central role to play in educating a rational populace” [40, p. 454]. La-
grange himself articulated such views throughout his lifetime, writing as early as 1775
that synthetic geometry was sometimes better than analytic because of “the luminous
clarity that accompanies it” [19, p. 135], and, near the end of his life, telling his friend
Fre´de´ric Maurice that “geometric considerations give force and clarity to judgement”
[19, p. 1295].
So the French geometers would not have been favorably disposed to inventing a
non-Euclidean geometry. It is no wonder that only comparative outsiders like the Hun-
garian Janos Bolyai and the Russian Nikolai Ivanovich Lobachevsky were the first to
publish on this topic. Even Gauss, who out of fear of criticism did not publish his own
invention of the subject that he christened “non-Euclidean geometry,” was somewhat
outside the French mathematical mainstream.
The British would not have found inventing non-Euclidean geometry enticing ei-
ther. Even William Rowan Hamilton, who in the 1840s was to devise the first noncom-
mutative algebra, wrote in 1837, “No candid and intelligent person can doubt the truth
of the chief properties of Parallel Lines, as set forth by Euclid in his Elements, two
thousand years ago. . . . The doctrine involves no obscurity nor confusion of thought
and leaves in the mind no reasonable ground for doubt” [21, p. 354]. In fact, even after
Hermann von Helmholtz and W. K. Clifford had introduced non-Euclidean geometry
into Victorian Britain, some British thinkers continued to maintain that real space had
to be Euclidean. There was a great deal at stake in Britain: the doctrine of the unity
of truth, the established educational program based on the Euclidean model of reason,
and the attitudes toward authority that this entailed.
The authority and rigor of Euclid, both in Britain and in France, were part and parcel
of the established intellectual order. And—one last social point—non-Euclidean ge-
ometry even in the twentieth century was culturally seen as anti-establishment, partly
through its association with relativity theory. For instance, surrealist artists used it that
way: misunderstood, perhaps, but still explicitly part of their assault on traditional
artistic canons. Two examples are Yves Tanguy’s “Le Rendez-vous des paralle`les”
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Figure 8. M. C. Escher (1898–1972), “Hand with Reflecting Sphere.” c© 2008 The M.C. Escher Company-
Holland: All rights reserved.
(1935) and Max Ernst’s “Young Man Intrigued by the Flight of a Non-Euclidean Fly”
(1942–1947).
And Figure 8 shows an example from an artist who really did understand what a
3-dimensional non-Euclidean space might look like.
7. CONCLUSION. I cannot explain why Lagrange initially thought that his proof
was a good one, but I hope it is clear why he thought he needed to prove the parallel
postulate, and why he tried to prove it using the techniques that he used.
The story I have told reminds us that, although the great eighteenth-century math-
ematicians are our illustrious forbears, our world is not theirs. We no longer live in
a world of certainty, symmetry, and universal agreement. But it was only in such a
world that the work of Lagrange and Laplace, Fourier and Kant, Euler and d’Alembert
could flourish. That space must be Euclidean was part of the Cartesian, Leibnizian,
Newtonian, symmetric, economical, and totally rationalistic world view that underlies
all of Lagrange’s mathematics and classical mechanics—ideas that, from Newton and
Leibniz through Kant and Laplace, buttressed the whole eighteenth-century view of
the universe and the laws that govern it. And the certainty of Euclidean geometry was
the model for the whole Enlightenment program of finding universally-agreed-upon
truth through reason.
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Thus, though Lagrange’s illustrious audience in Paris may have realized that his
proof was wrong, their world-view made them unable to imagine that the parallel pos-
tulate couldn’t be proved, much less to imagine that the world itself might be other-
wise.
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